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# REPORT

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**SUPPLEMENT TO  
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**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

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Czechoslovak Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky felt that the Kosice Agreement was politically badly drafted. In his opinion, the Agreement should have conceded to the Slovaks fewer rights in principle, which could then be enlarged in time, whereas actually the opposite occurred. To Zapotocky, the Kosice Agreement was from the outset based on the politically wrong assumption that the Communist Party would be stronger in Slovakia than in Bohemia and Moravia because Slovakia was liberated by the Red Army much earlier than were the Czech regions, thus creating supposedly better natural conditions in Slovakia for a quick buildup of the Communist Party. Zapotocky also said that the political agents (i.e., Klement Gottwald, who was active in Slovakia for a long time during the First Czechoslovak Republic) had quite forgotten that the industrial workmen were far stronger and more developed in Bohemia and Moravia than in Slovakia, which before World War II was a predominantly agricultural area. He also felt that the significance of the Slovak insurrection in 1944 was being overestimated.

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collaboration of a considerable part of the Czech workmen with the German occupation regime for trifling material advantages and concluded that the Slovaks were more revolutionary minded than the Czechs. [redacted]

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[redacted] the objective conditions for revolutionary action in Bohemia were quite different from those in Slovakia at the time of the Slovak insurrection of Banska Bystrica in 1944, when the Soviet Army stood before the Slovak border but was still far from Bohemia and Moravia.

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3. The leaders of the KSC tried at first to avoid any conflict with the KSS, because the internal political situation in Czechoslovakia was not yet ripe for measures to resolve such a conflict. The first urgent task was the liquidation of other political parties that blocked the KSC on its way to power. Only after power had been attained could purges inside the Party be started. During the period from 1945 to 1948, all currents in the KSC and KSS were united in preparing and accomplishing the seizure of state power by the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. After the seizure of power in February 1948, purges in the Party had to take place. But the purges in the KSC did not start at the highest level but first affected the national committees, the local, district, and regional organizations of the Party, where gradually functionaries active before February 1948 were replaced who were no longer considered completely reliable, since they were to a certain extent compromised by their collaboration with members of the Czech bourgeoisie whom they tried to gain for the cause of Communism before February 1948.
4. Klement Gottwald, Antonin Zapotocky, and Rudolf Slansky agreed on the necessity of ultimately removing the dualism between the KSC and KSS. Vladimir Clementis and his followers opposed a fusion through which the supremacy of the KSC was to be realized over the whole territory of Czechoslovakia; they shared the conviction that the autonomy of Slovakia in the sense of the Kosice Agreement implied the existence of an independent Slovak Communist Party. Clementis stressed that the KSS was ready to collaborate most closely with the Central Committee of the KSC, where the KSS was represented, but that the KSS claimed the decisive word in matters solely concerning Slovakia. Viliam Siroky, on the other hand, regarded the dualism as harmful to Party unity and pointed to the example of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Soviet Union (VKP (b)). He contended that political dualism in the Party must lead to a sort of national dualism between Czechs and Slovaks, and that the first step to resolve these contradictions should be the unification of both parties under a unified central leadership. [redacted]
5. As early as 1948, the Soviet Ambassador in Rome, Mikhail A. Kostylev, expressed his interest in the Czech-Slovak relationship and wondered how this political dualism could exist within the Communist Party. He said that if the Slovaks had not accepted the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic they would have been in the position of a defeated state which fought with Germany against the USSR. Kostylev expressed his conviction that Gottwald with Zapotocky and Slansky would find a way out of this unnatural dualism between the KSC and KSS. On this occasion Kostylev asked [redacted] whether [redacted] the declaration of Clementis in 1940 which criticized the treaty between the USSR and Germany, and also whether [redacted] in 1948 Clementis in Paris had met the former Czechoslovak Ambassador in Rome, Dr. Jan Pauliny-Toth, who had resigned his post in 1948. [redacted] Clementis did not have the confidence of Moscow, and so informed Zapotocky orally in January 1949. Zapotocky replied only that he got the same information from Paris.

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6. In 1949, after his journey to Slovakia, Zapotocky told [ ] that in his view the Slovak working people wanted real fraternal collaboration with the Czechs, but that this was obstructed by the Slovak bourgeoisie which was reactionary and anti-socialist and still desired the establishment of an independent Slovak state. Besides there existed, in Zapotocky's view, intellectual groups inside the KSS which directly or indirectly supported these efforts. But these tendencies would not last long. When asked whether he saw no danger in making big industrial investments in Slovakia after the sad experience of 1939, Zapotocky replied that the creation of new industries in Slovakia and the transfer of certain kinds of production, especially of metallurgic enterprises, from the Czech borderland to Slovakia had primarily military-strategic but also political reasons. Creation of new industries in Slovakia would increase the number of industrial workers there who would form the basic mass of the Communist Party. The leadership of the KSS could thus pass to workmen with a very different attitude toward the Czechs from that of the Slovak bourgeoisie and Slovak intellectuals who still influenced the leadership of the KSS. 25X1
7. The decisive blow against Clementis and his adherents was struck in 1950 at the plenary conference of the KSS where he was accused of nationalist deviation and invited to offer an oral self-criticism and to admit his deviation. The majority of delegates did not accept the self-criticism offered by Clementis, who denied the accusation of nationalist deviation, and they voted for exclusion of Clementis and his group from the KSC. The subsequent arrest of Clementis and his closest collaborators was only the natural sequence of all this.
8. [ ] Zapotocky, though never fond of Clementis, 25X1  
opposed the latter's arrest and proposed that he be left at liberty in some less significant post without possibilities for political activity. Gottwald at first shared this opinion. Later on, on instructions from Moscow, Gottwald and Zapotocky had to abandon their view and consented to the arrest of Clementis. At the Soviet Embassy in Rome, Clementis' arrest was accepted as an obvious matter which needed no further discussion.
9. The case of Clementis may thus be summed up as follows: Clementis and his adherents who controlled the decisive majority in the leadership of the KSS held to the conception of national and political independence of Slovakia, both toward Moscow and toward Prague. They were ready to cooperate in building up socialism in Czechoslovakia on this basis. Such a political autonomy with nationalist overtones did not conform to the conceptions of either the Moscow or the Moscow-controlled Prague leadership. However, it was not possible to liquidate Clementis and his group before the Communist Party seized absolute power in Czechoslovakia and fortified its position. The first task of the KSC was the liquidation of the so-called bourgeois parties, and to this end the collaboration of the KSS was needed. After that it was only a question of time when the liquidation of the leadership of the KSS, from Clementis down, would be realized.
10. After the liquidation of the Clementis group there remained three principal groups in the leadership of the Party, that is, the groups of Slansky, of Gottwald, and of Zapotocky. In the struggle for power within the Party since 1948, the Slansky group virtually seized the leadership of the KSC. Slansky, Bedrich Geminder, Gen. Bedrich Reicin, Josef Frank, Gustav Bares, and Marie Svermova were generally considered as people completely devoted to Moscow and also appointed to their posts by Moscow. [ ] 25X1

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